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Vanita Goela*

A Proposed Transjudicial Approach to
s. 15(2) Charter Adjudication

Canada and India are both pluralistic democracies with diverse populations.
Both countries have drafted constitutional provisions which enshrine equality
rights and permit affirmative action.
In India, various disadvantaged groups receive special protection from the
Constitution of India, such as the Other Backward Classes (OBC). The Supreme
Court of India has held that States and the Central government must identify the
"creamy layer" within the OBC category so that reservations target members who
are most in need. Otherwise, the OBC category is overinclusive. The creamy
layer includes those who are socially and economically advanced and who no
longer require the benefits of the reservation system.
Race-based affirmative action may be overinclusive in Canada. For this
reason, the author argues that the Supreme Court of Canada should explore the
concept of creamy layer in any of its future decisions on s. 15(2) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Le Canada et Inde sont tous deux des ddmocraties pluralistes aux populations
diverses. Ils ont tous deux adopt6 des dispositions constitutionnelles oc) sont
enchisses les droits a I'6galit6 et qui permettent Ia , discrimination positive .
En Inde, Ia constitution du pays accorde 6 divers groupes d6savantagds une
protection speciale, notamment, par exemple aux - autres castes de bas statut -.
La Cour supreme de I'lnde a tranche que les Etats et le gouvernement central
doivent determiner les personnes qui constituent - '16ite, au sein des castes de
bas statut afin de limiter les benefices du systeme de reservations aux membres
de Ia societ6 qui en ont le plus besoin. Sinon, force est de conclure que Ia definition
des autres castes de bas statut est trop inclusive. L'elite comprend les personnes
avantagees socialement et dconomiquement qui n'ont plus besoin des b6nefices
du systeme de reservations.
Selon cette thdorie, au Canada, Ia discrimination positive fondee sur Ia race serait
trop inclusive. C'est pourquoi Iauteure avance que Ia Cour supreme du Canada
devrait examiner le concept d'6lite dans toutes ses d6cisions futures fondees sur
le paragraphe 15(2) de Ia Charte canadienne des droits et libertes..
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Introduction
Canada and India are both pluralistic democracies with diverse populations.
Accompanying diversity is the existence of minority or equity groups
which have been historically disadvantaged or have faced discrimination.
Both common law countries strive towards the elimination of inequality.
To move forward on the path to equality, Canada and India drafted
constitutional provisions which enshrine equality rights.
In Canada, minorities include groups based on ethnicity and race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, disability or sexual orientation.'
Aboriginal peoples and linguistic minorities occupy a special place as
minority groups in Canada, which is acknowledged in the Canadian
CharterofRights andFreedoms [CanadianCharter]and the Constitution
Act, 1982.2

The general constitutional provision regarding equality is s. 15 of
the CanadianCharterand has been in force since 1985. Section 15(2) is
Canada's affirmative action provision.
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals
or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.
In India, minority groups are defined based on religion, race, sex
and place of birth.3 . But they are also described by their caste or tribe.
Disadvantaged caste groups and people from tribal areas receive special

I.

The enumerated grounds from s. 15(1) of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms.

2.
CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, ss. 16-23, 35 [CanadianCharter].
3.
Constitution of India, 1950, came into force 26 January 1950 and adopted by the Constituent
Assembly on 26 November 1949, art. 15 [IndiaConst.].
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protection in the Indian Constitution.' These people are described as
belonging to the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). An
additional group of people considered to be historically disadvantaged in
India include the Other Backward Classes (OBC). 5
Articles 14 through 16 of the Indian Constitution are the principal

provisions of equality and have largely been in force since 1950.6 The
relevant broad equality provisions in the Indian Constitution are found in
article 15:
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent
the State from making any special provision for the advancement of
any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes and the Schedules Tribes.'
The Constitution (Ninety-third amendment) Act, 2005
subsection 5 to article 15. Article 15(5) prescribes that:

added

Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19
shall prevent the State from, making any special provision, by law, for
the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes
of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so
far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational
institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or

4.
Ibid. at arts. 341-42, which relate to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. These special provisions
have allowed for action against discrimination towards these groups and compensatory discrimination
in their favour: Vani K. Borooah, Amaresh Dubey & Sriya Iyer, "The Effectiveness of Jobs Reservation:
Caste, Religion and Economic Status in India" (2007) 38 Development and Change 423 at 423-424.
5.
I use the term "backward" as it is used in the Indian context. For the purposes of this paper, the
relevant articles which refer to the backward classes are 15, 16 and 340; India has also been considering
a women's reservation in Parliament, see: Bhaskar Roy, "Finally, Women Set to Get 33% Quota" The
limes of India (29 January 2008); for additional articles on the backward classes, see also: Pradipta
Chaudhury, "The 'Creamy Layer': Political Economy of Reservations," in Sukhadeo Thorat, Aryama
& Prashant Negi, eds., Reservation and PrivateSector,Questfor EqualOpportunityand Growth (New
Delhi: Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, Rawat Publications, 2005) 299 at 300 [Chaudhury].
6.
Art. 15(4) was added by the Constitution (FirstAmendment) Act, 1951, s. 2; certain words in art.
16(3) were substituted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, s. 29 and Schedule: P.M.
Bakshi,-The Constitution ofIndia (Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2005), online: <http://indiacode.
nic.in/coiweb/coifiles/amendment.htm>.
7.
Article 29(2) states that "[n]o citizen should be denied admission into any educational institution
maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
language or any of them."
8.
No. 23 of 2005 (20 January 2006).
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unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions
referred to in clause (1) of article 30. 9

Article 16 relates to employment in the public sector. The relevant
provisions are:
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters
relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.

(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any
backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not
adequately represented in the services under the State.
Affirmative action in any country is controversial. However, the Indian
courts have tried to address the deeper complex question of determining
who is truly disadvantaged, even within the groups traditionally labelled
as disadvantaged. Reservations are a quota-based form of affirmative
action confined to the public sector, which apply to the SC, ST and the
OBC.' O The object of reservations is not merely representation of the
disadvantaged in the public service but to elevate the social and educational
status of these groups." The Supreme Court of India has held that States
and the Central government must identify what has been referred to as
the "creamy layer" within the OBC category so that reservations target
members who are most in need.'" The creamy layer includes those who
are socially and economically advanced and who no longer require the
benefits of the reservation system. 3
The focus of this paper will be on judicial pronouncements on the
constitutionality of the reservation and quota system in India by the
Supreme Court of India, in comparison to the Supreme Court of Canada's

9.
This subsection was the subject of recent controversy in the Thakur 2008 case which will be
discussed further below: Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Others Writ Petition (civil) No.
265 of 2006 with others, Supreme Court of India, online: <http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.
asp>; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1 [Thakur 2008].
10. Reservations allot or facilitate access to valued positions or resources, Galanter, infra note 18 at 1,
43; reservations are a state policy involving the reservation of seats in legislatures, public employment
and educational institutions for the underprivileged and disadvantaged: Arvind Sharma, Reservation
and Affirmative Action: Models of Social Integration in India and the United States (Thousand Oaks,
2005: Sage Publications) at Glossary [Sharma]; see also Chaudhury, supra note 5.
11. Georgette David, "La reservation des emplois aux drfavorises dans I'Inde" (1983) 43 Revue
Juridique et Politique, Independence et Cooperation 859.
12. IndraSawhney v. Union of India and others, [1992] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 454 [Indra Sawhney 1992];
see also the discussion of Thakur 2008 below.
13. See discussion of Indra Sawhney 1992 below.
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interpretation of the affirmative action provision in the CanadianCharter,
with particular attention given to the creamy layer concept.
There are various definitions of the concept of affirmative action: it
is a public policy which helps a state attain social justice either through
quotas or prioritizing benefits to minorities or discriminated groups 4;
it aims to increase opportunities for under-represented groups15 ; it can
nullify discrimination 6; and it is historical restitution or reparation to
7
offset cumulative deprivation suffered by depressed people in the past.
I distinguish between affirmative action initiatives which aim at diversity
and those which target socio-economic disadvantage. This is to highlight
the fact that diversity policies may focus on representation but not
necessarily address disadvantage.
The definition of who is disadvantaged evolves in society. Affirmative
action policies which aim at eliminating disadvantage based on who is
currently disadvantaged may differ from implementing a policy focussed
on groups who have been historically disadvantaged. Also, individuals
who may require increased access to opportunities might not obtain
them because persons from that group may already be represented or
considered to be advantaged. Conversely, all individuals within an underrepresented group may not in fact be disadvantaged. Therefore, the goal
of an affirmative action policy is important to identify.
It appears from the Indianjurisprudence that reservations or affirmative
action measures may be overinclusive when relating to identity. Although
Canada does not rely on a quota system in its affirmative action laws,
policies or programs, it appears that race-based affirmative action may be
overinclusive in Canada as well. For this reason, I argue that the Supreme
Court of Canada should explore the concept of creamy layer in any of
its future decisions on s. 15(2) and race. In Part I, I examine reservations
in the Indian context and the creamy layer jurisprudence. In Part II, I
review academic literature on the problem of overinclusive programs
based on race. In Part III, I discuss the Supreme Court of Canada's cases
on affirmative action and provide arguments in favour of a creamy layer
analysis.

14.

Maria Clara Dias, "Affirmative Action and Social Justice" (2003-2004) 36 Conn. L. Rev. 871 at

871 [Dias].
15. Laura Dudley Jenkins, Identity and Identification in India: Defining the Disadvantaged(London

and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) at 1 [Jenkins, Identity and Identification].
16. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, "Discrimination and the Aim of Proportional Representation" (2008)
7 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 159 at 160.
17. Anirudh Prasad, ReservationalJustice to Other Backward Classes (OBCs) (New Delhi: Deep &

Deep Publications, 1997) at 143 [Prasad].
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The context in India

India and affirmative action
India has had a long history of affirmative action initiatives and has
the "longest standing quota system in the world."' 8 As the most diverse
democracy in the world, India has had a reservation policy enshrined in
the Indian Constitution since its inception in 1950, based on one which
existed even prior to independence in 1947.19 In response to the deep social
divisions created by caste, which have led to ghettoization, poverty and
stigma, the framers of the Indian Constitution and government authorities
realized the reservation system in order to found a new balance in Indian
20
society based on substantive equality.

Who are the OBC?
The OBC are persons who belong to groups which are not SC or ST and
who are contained in the OBC list created by the Indian government. 21 The
term is used interchangeably with the phrase "socially and educationally
backward classes" (SEBC) and is found in Indian jurisprudence as well as
the Indian Constitution. The OBC are communities thought to be socially

18. The Maharaja of Kholapur Maharashtra introduced the first Government Order recognizing
reservations for backward classes in the State administration in approximately 1902: V. Chandra
Sekhar, Other Backward Classes in India, Recognition & Reservation (New Delhi: Raj Publications,
2006) [Sekhar]; Surinder S. Jodhka & Katherine Newman, "In the Name of Globalisation: Meritocracy,
Productivity and the Hidden Language of Caste" Economic and Political Weekly 42:41 (13 October
2007) 4125 at 4125; Anonymous, "India's Creamy Layer" The Wilson Quarterly 31:4 (Autumn 2007)
86; Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1984) at 1, 7-8, 14-16, 26-40 [Galanter]; Frrddric Bobin, "lnde: bilan mitigd de 90
ans de discrimination positive" Le Monde (26 January 2008); Thomas Boston & Usha Nair-Reichert,
"Affirmative Action: Perspectives from the United States, India and Brazil" (2003) 27 Western Journal
of Black Studies 3 at 3, 8 [Boston and Nair-Reichert]; Sukhadeo Thorat & Katherine S. Newman,
"Caste and Economic Discrimination: Causes, Consequences and Remedies" Economic and Political
Weekly 42:41 (13 October 2007) 4121 at 4122; Laura Dudley Jenkins, "Race, Caste and Justice:
Social Science Categories and Antidiscrimination Policies in India and the United States" (2003-2004)
36 Conn. L. Rev. 747 at 753 [Jenkins, "Race"]; Dipankar Gupta, "Caste and Politics : Identity Over
System" (2005) 34 Ann. Rev. Anthropol. 409 at 410 [Gupta 2005].
19. Galanter, ibid. at 26-40; Jenkins, Identity and Race, supra note 15 at 2; Sharma, supranote 10 at
c. 6.
20. Jenkins, Identity and Race, supra note 15 at 1; Galanter, ibid.at 1, 7, 10, 14-16; Gupta explains
that varna refers to the four orders in society. Each order also had a colour pennant of its own,
representing different phases of the sun's journey around the earth: Dipankar Gupta, "The Politics
of 'Caste is Race': The Impact of Urbanization" in Rik Pinxten & Ellen Precker, eds., Racism in
MetropolitanAreas (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006) at 57 [Gupta, "Politics"]; see also
Thakur 2008, supra note 9 and Indra Sawhney 1992, supranote 12.
21. National Commissionfor Backward Classes Act, 1993, No. 27 of 1993, s. 2(a) [NCBC Act].
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and educationally backward and can belong to any religion or caste. 22 The

OBC lists are prepared for the purpose of providing reservations for the
23

backward classes in government employment.
The concept of a creamy layer, individuals who are the socially,
educationally and sometimes economically advanced members of the
OBC, evolved as a judicial response to complaints that some people in
the OBC category who were targeted by reservations did not in fact need
them. 24 It should be emphasized that the creamy layer concept applies only
to the OBC category and not to the SC or ST. According to remarks by the
Supreme Court of India, the creamy layer concept is not a general principle
of equality and it does not apply to the SC and ST.25 In other words, not
all alleged violations of equality will require an examination of a creamy
layer, unless they involve the OBC. The roots of the current controversy
surrounding reservations for OBCs are found in the Mandal Report 26 and
the resulting influential Supreme Court of India decision in Indra Sawhney
1992, which will be discussed below.

22. Jenkins explains that although caste contradicts some tenets of Islam, caste-like stratification
persists in India based on distinctions surrounding religious conversion, immigration and hierarchies
founded on occupation. Likewise, caste inequalities exist within the Christian communities where
Dalits (untouchables) who convert from Hinduism continue to face social and economic disadvantages
associated with their caste: Laura Dudley Jenkins, "Becoming Backward: Preferential Policies and
Religious Minorities in India" (2001) 39:2 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 32 at 32 [Jenkins,
"Backward"].
23. NCBCAct, supra note 21 at s. 2(c): "lists" means lists prepared by the Government of India from
time to time for purposes of making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of
backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of that Government, are not adequately represented
in the services under the Government of India and any local or other authority within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government of India.
24. See discussion of Supreme Court of India jurisprudence below; Ashwini Deshpande & Katherine
Newman, "Where the Path Leads: The Role of Caste in Post-University Employment Expectations"
Economic and Political Weekly 42:41 (13 October 2007) 4133 at 4140; Chaudhury, supra note 5 at
305, asserts that reservations serve essentially as tools for the absorption of the privileged sections of
the lower castes in the ruling classes.
25. Thakur 2008, supra note 9 at paras. 161, 165; Indra Sawhney 1992, supra note 12 at para. 86.
26. India, Backward Classes Commission, Reservationsfor Backward Classes,Mandal Commission
Report of the Blackward Classes Commission, 1980, (Delhi: Akalank Publications, 1991) [Mandal
Report]. On 20 December 1978, the Prime Minister of India announced the decision to appoint a
Backward Classes Commission, pursuant to art. 340 of the Indian Constitution. The terms of reference
of the Commission, inter alia,were to determine the criteria for defining the socially and educationally
backward classes. On 31 December 1980, the Chairman of the Commission, B.P. Mandal, presented
the Mandal Report to the Government of India. The Commission concluded that based on the available
census data, the population of OBCs was estimated at 52% of the total population of India. This
is in addition to the SC/ST population which amounts to 22.5%. The Commission noted that the
reservation for SC/ST is in proportion to their population, however, based on a legal obligation to keep
reservations under arts. 15(4) and 16(4) of the Indian Constitutionbelow 50%, they recommended that
the OBC reservation be 27%.
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Who gets on the OBC list is controversial and involves examining
several factors.27 Within the OBC communities, there exists a creamy
layer and the current creamy layer criteria are posted on the National
Commission for Backward Classes website.28 These people are excluded
from reservations. The creamy layer includes an extensive list of criteria,
such as, inter alia: children of the President of India, children of judges,
lawyers, doctors, engineers, or property owners, and children of persons
having a gross annual income above Rs. 2.5 lakhs. 29 Although most of
these criteria include economic and occupational considerations, they are
all directly or indirectly related to social advancement.3 °
The creamy layer criteria are a reminder that an individual's level of
backwardness is not static, but rather dynamic and constantly evolving.
Thus, it is necessary to continuously distinguish the truly disadvantaged
from the creamy layer.
Supreme Court of India creamy layerjurisprudence
In several cases the Supreme Court of India questioned whether the category
of OBCs was overinclusive. These cases show an evolution and judicial
acceptance of the creamy layer concept and its place alongside the main
principles of an equality analysis. Reference to these cases is made within
the context of affirmative action programs which target the disadvantaged
and not the ideal of diversity or proportional representation. 3'
The Supreme Court of India cases show an attempt by the judiciary
to provide guidelines to the government on how to avoid the problem of
overinclusion. In a country where reservations affect millions of people
and where poverty and social and educational disadvantage is more
common than not, the question of who benefits from higher education or
a government job is crucial. Defining beneficiaries is also essential in the
27. In 1993, the OBC list contained 1257 castes. In 2006 the list grew to 2297: Manoj Mitta, "OBC
list shot up by 90% since Mandal I" The Times of India (25 May 2006). See also, Government of
India, National Commission for Backward Classes, "Central List of Other Backward Classes", online:
<http://www.ncbc.nic.in/backward-classes/index.html>.
28. The National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) was created pursuant to the NCBC
Act as a permanent body in 1993, in response to the Supreme Court of India's directions in the Indra
Sawhney 1992 decision. Its functions include examining "requests for inclusion of any class of citizens
as a backward class in the lists and hear complaints of overinclusion or underinclusion of any backward
class in such lists and tender such advice to the Central Government as it deems appropriate". Indra
Sawhney 1992, supra note 12; online <http://www.ncbc.nic.in/html/aboutus.html>; <http://www.
ncbc.nic.in/html/creamylayer.html>; NCBCAct, supra note 12 at s. 9.
29. Rs. = Rupees; one lakh = 100 000; online: <http://www.ncbc.nic.in/html/creamylayer.html>.
30. Justice Reddy provides examples of who is socially advanced in the discussion of IndraSawhney
1992, below, but it involves holding elevated social status and society's perceptions of one's social
standing.
31. James Hendry highlights, however, that increasing representation is usually seen as a way to aid
the disadvantaged and not as a separate goal: email communication, James Hendry (27 March 2009).
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quest for equality, where inequality has existed for so long. It is fairly
settled that the SC and ST are entitled to affirmative action programs. But
with competing claims for reservations from the OBC for limited seats
in employment and higher education, the importance of delineating the
category clearly has become a pressing matter. One may implement an
affirmative action program targeting the OBC, so long as the creamy layer
is excluded from it. The language of the bench in the Indra Sawhney 1992
case confirms that India's debate on the existence of affirmative action is
not whether it should exist, but rather the narrower question of who should
benefit from it.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992)
The 1992 Indra Sawhney decision is the authoritative decision on
reservations for the OBC, up until the recent decision in Thakur 2008. It
has also been noted for the beginnings of "creamy layerization."3 2 Indra
Sawhney 1992 was decided by a nine-judge bench and dealt with the
issue of employment with the public service and art. 16. The petitioners'
arguments were based on an Office Memorandum, dated 13 August 1990,
and issued by the Central government, which was prepared subsequent to
the findings in the Mandal Report. The Memorandum granted reservations
in civil posts and government service to the OBC in the amount of 27%. 33
The petitioners argued that the Memorandum was unconstitutional, as
the reservation for OBCs was not valid and contrary to the principles of
equality.34 They sought a stay of the operation of the Memorandum, which
the Supreme Court of India granted.3"
After the federal election in 1991, the government changed and it
issued a modified Office Memorandum, dated 25 September 1991.36
The government amended the Memorandum "in order to enable the
poorer sections of the SEBCs to receive the benefits of reservation on
a preferential basis and to provide reservation for other economically
backward sections of the people not covered by any of the existing schemes
of reservation."37
At issue was whether these Memoranda were constitutionally valid.
Justice Reddy, writing for the majority, introduced his reasons by stating
that the Indian Republic was founded with the objective of securing

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Prasad, supra note 17 at 127, 143.
IndraSawhney 1992, supra note 12 at para. 22.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 23.
Ibid. at para. 24.
Ibid.
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justice, liberty, equality and fraternity for its citizens.38 He noted that
although poverty is present in all societies, none has had the misfortune of
castes and its social division of Indian society superimposed on poverty.3 9
According to Reddy J., the concept of equality before the law contemplates
minimizing inequalities in income and opportunities, while promoting
the educational and economic interests of weaker sections of people and
protecting them from social injustice and exploitation.4"
Public employment, explained Reddy J. always gave a certain status
and power in India.4 In order to assure equality of opportunity, it may
be necessary to treat unequally situated persons unequally.42 Article
16(4) provides that the State may make provisions for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which
in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services
under the State.
The word "class" within the term "backward classes" is used so as
not to limit the class to those belonging to a caste and to apply across the
country, and further, that class denotes a social class, and not one in Marxist
terms. 43 As to how the "backward class of citizens" should be identified,
the criteria for backwardness is determinative, not caste itself.' This is
notable since a caste system takes its form even in non-Hindu religions,
which has been judicially recognized by the Supreme Court of India. 5
The context of article 16(4) was to include the socially backward
classes, as social backwardness leads also to educational backwardness.4 6
The SC and ST are not included in article 16(4), but there is no reason
to qualify or restrict the meaning of the expression "backward class of
citizens" by finding that OBCs are similarly situated to the SC/ST.47
With respect to the "means" test and "creamy layer" problem, the
Court provided guidelines for differentiating between the forward sections

38. Only the relevant substantive legal questions relating to the equality analysis and the creamy
layer concept will be discussed; ibid. at para. 1.
39. Ibid at para. 2.
40. Ibid at para. 5.
41. Ibid. at para. 7.
42. Ibid at para. 56.
43. Ibid at paras. 81-82.
44. Ibid at paras. 83-84; Chaudhury, supra note 5, notes that the 1888 Reports on the Condition
of the Lower Classes of the Population in India showed that in eastern Uttar Pradesh, Brahmins,
Bhuminars and Rajputs (high castes) were worse off than day labourers, were in debt, and suffered
from insufficient food and clothing in normal times.
45. Ibid at para. 80.
46. Ibid at para. 85.
47. Ibid at para. 88.
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of a backward class.4" The means test signifies an income limit for the
purpose of excluding persons from the backward classes. 49 Justice Reddy
asserted that economic criteria should not be the basis of exclusion from
a backward class, unless the advancement is so high that it includes social
advancement.5 0 A backward class cannot be identified by economic criteria
alone, but may be identified without reference to caste.5
Justice Reddy provided the example of a member of the carpenter
caste who works in the Middle East and makes a high income compared
to Indian standards. He asked whether the carpenter's children should be
excluded from the backward class or from the application of art. 16(4) in
India.5 2 According to Reddy, J.'s criteria, the exclusion should only apply
if the carpenter's income rendered him socially advanced.53 The carpenter
in this situation would become socially advanced if he accumulated so
much wealth that he became a factory owner himself and then provided
employment to others.5 4 Accordingly, in such a case, the person's social
status rises.55
Likewise, Justice Reddy remarked that certain positions are treated as
socially advanced in India. For example, if a member of a backward class
becomes a member of any All India Service, his social status rises and he
56
is no longer socially disadvantged.
Reddy J. further remarked that income may not count for much
in larger cities or in the case of a rural scenario, as the extent of an
agriculturist's holdings may be difficult to measure.57 As a result, only the
socially advanced should be excluded from the purpose of art. 16(4), in
order to define a truly backward class.58 Reddy J. also emphasized that this
exclusion only applies to OBCs and not to STs and SCs.59

48. Ibid. at para. 86.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. at paras. 90-91. A further example of why economic criteria may be misleading is given
in a recent study which observed that in Bihar, 7% of the SC experience a high standard of living,
whereas twice this percentage of high caste families are among the impoverished: Lance Brennan, John
McDonald & Ralph.Shlomowitz, "Caste, Inequality and the Nation-State: The Impact of Reservation
Policies in India, c. 1950-2000" (2006) 29 South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 117 at 146.
52. Indra Sawhney 1992, ibid.at para. 86.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.; Thakur 2008, supra note 9 at paras. 161, 165.
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Justice Reddy directed that the Government of India specify the basis
of the "creamy layer" within four months.60 The excluded
exclusion
of
persons would cease to be members of the OBC. He further directed
that the impugned Office Memoranda of 1990 and 1991 be implemented
subject only to such specification and exclusion of socially advanced
persons from the backward classes. 6'
The main principle regarding the creamy layer which emerges from
Justice Reddy's reasons is that exclusion from a backward class must be
based on social advancement and not merely economic criteria. Economic
factors may only be considered if the advancement is so high that it renders
that person socially advanced.
India "s9 3 rd Constitutionalamendment and the Thakur litigation
In January 2007, the Indian government enacted The CentralEducational
Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006,62 pursuant to the 9 3 rd
constitutional amendment allowing for reservations in certain educational
institutions of higher education. The reservation quota for the SCs and
STs is 15% and 7.5% respectively.6 3 The reservation quota for OBCs is
27%.

64

A private advocate, Ashoka Kumar Thakur and others launched
a constitutional attack on the CEI Act.65 The petitioners/appellants
brought a motion for a stay in the Supreme Court of India against the
Union of India on the basis that the 27% reservation quota for OBCs was
unconstitutional, and that the CEI Act was invalid, as it did not exclude
the "creamy layer."
The Supreme Court of India granted the stay, but specified that the
CEI Act would be stayed only in relation to the OBC category because
of the question of the creamy layer rule and whether it would apply to
article 15(5) of the Indian Constitution.66 The decision on the merits in

60.

Indra Sawhney 1992, ibid. at para. 117.

61. Ibid. at para. 86; Subsequent to this decision and based on the "Report of the Expert Committee
for specifying the criteria for identification of socially advanced persons among the socially and
educationally backward classes", the Government of India issued a modified Office Memorandum
on 8 September 1993, which outlined the creamy layer criteria for civil posts and services under the
Government of India: Sekhar, supra note 18 at 278-310, Appendices 6-7.
62. No. 5 of 2007 (3 January 2007) [CEIAct].
63. Ibid., ss. 3 (i)-(ii).
64. Ibid., s. 3(iii).
65. Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Ors., (2007) 4 S.C.C. 361 [Thakur2007]. In India,

the rules regarding standing are relaxed. Individuals may thus bring public interest or social action
litigation on behalf of the general public: Upendra Baxi, "Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action
Litigation in the Supreme Court of India" (1985) 1985 Third World Legal Stud. 107.
66. The matter was heard over several days and the bench reserved judgment on 1 November 2007.
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Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India was released on 10 April 2008.67
The Supreme Court of India bench of five judges delivered four sets of
reasons in the case.68 The Court confirmed that the creamy layer should
be excluded from reservations and that caste can be used to identify the
OBCs, but it cannot be the sole criterion.69
The Petitioners' arguments focussed on whether The Constitution
(Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 20050 and the CEI Act violated articles
14-16 of the Indian Constitution.7 They argued that the creamy layer
should be excluded from reservations in higher education, whereas the
Respondent argued that the creamy layer concept applies only to art. 16(4)
of the Indian Constitution,and not to articles 15(4) or 15(5).
The petitioners claimed that the CEI Act was invalid in view of the
definition of backward class and the identification of the class based on
caste. Chief Justice Balakrishnan found no constitutional violation since
caste can be used as a starting point for identifying a backward class.
However, he noted that within a caste group there is also inequality of
status, opportunity and social standing.72 Balakrishnan C.J. provided the
example of Brahmins who may be servants of a lower caste or of other
Brahmins.73 If the lists for determining backward classes take into account
social and educational backwardness, aside from castes, then they do not
violate art. 15(1). 74 As a result, he found that there was no violation of the
75
CEIAct.
The Supreme Court of India unanimously found that the creamy
layer should be excluded from the SEBC. Balakrishnan C.J. repeated
the observations of Justice Reddy in Indra Sawhney 1992 where it was
determined that the affluent section of a backward class does not require
reservations for further progress in society.76 He went on to explain the

67.

Thakur 2008, supra note 9.

68. Chief Justice Balakrishnan, Justices Pasayat, Thakker, Bhandari and Raveendran. What is
interesting to note about the number ofjudges on a bench of the Supreme Court of India is that a decision
with a larger quorum is binding on a smaller quorum at the same court. In the case at hand, the bench
in Thakur 2008 was bound by the nine-member panel in Indra Sawhney 1992: Sudhir Krishnaswamy
& Madhav Khosla, "Reading AK Thakur v. Unions ofIndia: Legal Effect and Significance" Economic
& Political Weekly 43:29 (19 July 2008) 53 [Kiishnaswamy & Khosla]; Thakur 2008, ibid. at para.

150.
69. Only the legal issues which relate to an equality analysis and the creamy layer will be
mentioned.
70.

No. 93 of 2005 (20 January 2006) [ConstitutionAmendment Act].

71.

No educational institution challenged the Acts.

72.

Thakur 2008, supra note 9 at para. 134.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Ibid. atpara. 134.
Ibid. atpara. 141.
Ibid. at para. 142.
Ibid. atparas. 147-148.
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necessity of distinguishing a creamy layer and the rationale behind the
concept in detail:
To fulfil the conditions and to find out truly what is a socially and
educationally backward class, the exclusion of [sic] "creamy layer" is
essential...
It may be noted that the "creamy layer" principle is applied not as a
general principle of reservation. It is applied for the purpose of identifying
the socially and educationally backward class...
Articles 15(4) and 15(5) are designed to provide opportunities in
education thereby raising educational, social and economical levels of
those who are lagging behind and once this progress is achieved by
this section, any legislation passed thereunder should be deemed to
have served its purpose. By excluding those who have already attained
economic well being or educational advancement, the special benefits
provided under these clauses cannot be further extended to them and, if
discriminatory or arbitrary, resulting
done so, it would be unreasonable,
77
in reverse discrimination.

The Chief Justice concluded by stating that this reasoning is applicable
to article 15(5) and that the creamy layer must be excluded to provide a
complete identification of SEBCs.
The definition of "backward class" in s. 2(g) of the CEI Act does not
exclude the creamy layer, but Balakrishnan C.J. deemed the application
of the principle of exclusion of the creamy layer.78 Bhandari J. noted
that the failure to expressly exclude the creamy layer in the CEI Act
could lead to an inference that Parliament meant it to be included in the
definition. 79 Despite the absence of the creamy layer language, he affirmed
that the creamy layer should never be included in any affirmative action
legislation.8" Including the creamy layer would mean that unequals would
be treated as equals, which in his opinion would violate equality."' Being
socially advanced, one cannot be part of the SEBC; one who is socially
82
forward is likely to also be educationally forward.

77. Ibid at paras. 149-150.
78. Ibid. at para. 155; CEIAct, supra note 62 at s. 2(g) "Other Backward Classes" means the class or
classes of citizens who are socially and educationally backward, and are so determined by the Central
Government.
79. Ibid. at para. 17, Justice Bhandari.
80. Ibid. at para. 18, Justice Bhandari.
81. Ibid. at para. 20, Justice Bhandari.
82. Ibid. at para. 32, Justice Bhandari.
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To prevent a violation of equality, Bhandari J.'s remedy was to sever
the implied inclusion of the creamy layer in art. 15(5). 3 Bhandari J. also
found support for the creamy layer exclusion in the text of articles 15(4)
and (5): the term creamy layer is synonymous with non-SEBC. 84 He
further stated that Parliament ought to have known that based on Indra
Sawhney 1992, the creamy layer would be excluded again by this Court
and if Parliament wanted to include the creamy layer, they would have
said it in the text of art. 15(5)."5

Bhandari J. then raised a question which is instructive for comparative
purposes: does the creamy layer exist outside of India? 6 He concluded
that it does and he presented the example of the United States of America
where a study found that certain groups have a better chance of being
admitted to college.87 The study concluded that Black, Latino and NativeAmerican students who scored the same as Whites or Asian students on
the SAT had a 28% better chance at gaining admission.88 Bhandari J. stated
that the failure to exclude the creamy layer excludes deserving students.8 9
It is unclear from this excerpt, however, if he perceives the Black, Latino
and Native-American students to be part of that creamy layer.
In conclusion, Balakrishnan C.J. and the bench found that the
ConstitutionAmendment Act and the CEI Act were constitutional, except

that the creamy layer should be excluded from reservations.9" This Court
made it clear that even when a creamy layer exclusion is not drafted in
legislation, it should and will be interpreted as being applicable whenever
there is reference to the OBC/SEBC. Furthermore, the Court stressed
the importance of properly identifying the OBC/SEBC by excluding the
creamy layer from the category.
The Supreme Court of India has confirmed that for the SEBC/OBC to be
properly defined, it must exclude the creamy layer, otherwise the category
is overinclusive and a violation of equality. 9' However, it is unclear from
certain statements from the Supreme Court of India as to whether creamy
83. Ibid at paras. 30, 53, Justice Bhandari. Of note is that Bhandari J. proposed that economic
criteria (income, occupation and land holdings) could be used as the exclusive means of identifying
the SEBC. However, he acknowledged that Indra Sawhney 1992 rejected the pure means test and
advised that after a ten-year review of the CEI Act, reservations should be granted on the basis of
economic criteria: Thakur 2008, ibid at paras. 228, 234, 248.
84. Ibid. at para. 33, Justice Bhandari.
85. Ibid. at para. 52, Justice Bhandari.
86. Ibid. at para. 47, Justice Bhandari.
87. Ibid, Justice Bhandari.
88. Ibid at para. 48, Justice Bhandari.
89. Ibid. at para. 49, Justice Bhandari.
90. Ibid. at paras. 163, 193, Chief Justice Balakrishnan.
91. Ibid. at paras. 30, 53, Justice Bhandari.

124

The Dalhousie Law Journal

layer is a general principle of equality, as it does not apply to the SC/ST
categories or to reservations generally; it only applies to the OBC.92 Thus,
it appears as though the test for equality and whether a reservation scheme
meets constitutional muster differs when the constitutional provisions
relate to the OBC/SEBC as opposed to the SC/ST categories.
Krishnaswamy and Khosla note that the equality provisions in articles
15 and 16 have different moral and policy justifications for affirmative
action, as in some cases the goal might be equality of opportunity and
in others the goals might be diversity or social inclusion.93 When the
justification for affirmative action differs by sector, the beneficiaries may
be distinct. 4 Thus, based on Krishnasawmy and Khosla's arguments,
the distinction between the goals of a policy is an important factor to
examine when the question of creamy layer is posed. Since the object of
carving out a creamy layer from a listed group is to ensure that the truly
disadvantaged benefit from a government reservation, the goal of diversity
may not demand a creamy layer consideration. On the other hand, equality
of opportunity would.
In India, the judicial discourse is not focussed on whether affirmative
action policies such as reservations should exist. Rather, the relevant
questions are based on defining who should receive the benefits of
reservations and the extent of preferential policies. Canada's judiciary
should similarly consider the problem of overinclusion in affirmative
action initiatives based on race in order to bring Canadian society closer
to equality.
II. The problem of classifying peoples
Over and underinclusiveness
The Supreme Court of India's creamy layer concept highlights the
problems associated with identifying people though a group lens within the
context of affirmative action. Sometimes, either undeserving individuals
are included as beneficiaries or deserving individuals are excluded. This
tension regarding over and underinclusion has been explored by authors
in India, Canada and the USA. The authors cited in this section agree
that group categorization is an inadequate method of identifying the truly
disadvantaged.

92. Ibid at para 160. Chief Justice Balakrishnan stated that the creamy layer principle is not yet a
principle of equality to apply to all affirmative action.
93. Krishnaswamy & Khosla, supra note 68 at 58.
94. Ibid.
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Affirmative action programs are only of assistance if the intended
beneficiaries are reached. 95 Being listed as an OBC has raised problems
of underinclusion and overinclusion, since inclusion in the OBC category
depends on the political skills, leadership and political bargaining power
of the groups seeking inclusion. 96
Even those groups listed as OBC have sought to be de-listed and
moved to the ST category.97 This has demonstrated that the OBC category
is unable to accommodate the interests of some communities.98 But for
those seeking SC/ST status, there is also the added advantage that the
creamy layer concept does not apply to the SC/ST categories, and the SC/
ST have reservations in the central and state legislatures, whereas the OBC
do not.
An additional phenomenon related to the question of inclusion in
a reserved category is the argument for sub-classifications where some
caste groups are asking for their own reservations, apart from the OBC
or SC category.99 This is remarkable considering that India has already
recognized "differential needs for affirmative action" in that the SC/ST
and OBC all have their own separate quotas. °0 This could be compared
to the situation in the USA where in Louisiana, French Acadians sought
and obtained minority status, just as Italians at City University New York
did.'01 In the Canadian context one could imagine that in a comparable ST
category the Inuit might request separate constitutional guarantees from the
Mtis or Indians. Similarly, if racial groups generally could be compared
95. Prasad, supranote 17 at 146; a growing number of Indians are demanding to be declared officially
'backward': Jenkins, "Race," supra note 18 at 32; Chaudhury, supra note 5 at 305, argues that the
politics of caste identity founded on reservations helps to push the economic problems facing the poor
away from centre stage; another author has referred to the promises of reservations for fellow caste
members by politicians as causing "reservation inflation": "Leaders: Untouchable and Unthinkable;
Indian Business" The Economist 385:8549 (6 October 2007) 17.
96. Suhas Palshikar, "Challenges before the Reservation Discourse" Economic & Political Weekly
40:17 (26 April 2008) 8 at 9-10 [Palshikar]; for example, the Gujjars and Meenas were both considered
to be criminal tribes during the British colonial period. The Indian government recognized the Meenas
as ST, but not the Gujjars. The Gujjars sought to be downgraded in the social hierarchy and considered
as a "backward class," as this would be a move "forward": Salil Tripathi, "India's Creeping Caste
Entitlements" FarEastern Economic Review 170:8 (October 2007) 49.
97. Palshikar, ibid.at 10.
98. Ibid.
99. Palshikar, ibid.; Fr~dric Bobin, "Au Rajasthan, conflit de castes autour des quotas," Le Monde
(26 January 2008).
100. Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon "Race, Class, Caste ...? Rethinking Affirmative
Action" (1998-1999) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1296 [Cunningham, "Race"].
101. Sean A. Pager, "Antisubordination of Whom? What India's Answer Tells Us About the Meaning
of Equality in Affirmative Action" (2007-2008) 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 289 at 303, 306 [Pager]. There
are groups classified as white who sought minority status to be included in affirmative action and were
recognized: Middle Eastern Americans in San Francisco, French Acadians in Louisiana, and Italian
Americans by the City University of New York.

126

The Dalhousie Law Journal

to the OBC lists, one might conceive of the Black community asking for
separate affirmative action programs from Asians, or to be constitutionally
recognized like the Aboriginals. No matter the country, there may never be
a perfect formula to guarantee that each person who is truly disadvantaged
will be afforded opportunities for advancement by the State.
Krishnaswamy and Khosla have argued that any method of
identification which uses groups as the unit of identification will encompass
problems of overinclusion and underinclusion. 02 Thus, an individualized
approach such as examining who belongs to the creamy layer is perhaps
one mechanism for carving out deserving beneficiaries in India.
In a similar manner, using race as an identifying label in North
America has presented shortcomings. Anita Indira Anand questioned
whether preferential policies in Canada are fair and effective in addressing
racial disadvantage.10 3 According to Anand, preferential policies can be
overinclusive in that they provide preferential treatment to groups which
do not require them and underinclusive in that they fail to provide treatment
to non-visible minorities who require preferential treatment."° Thus,
preferential policies should target the poor without regard to skin colour and
only target visible minorities if they are economically disadvantaged.° 5
Sean A. Pager critiques the use of the "quadrangle" of race in the USA
as disentitling the deserved and entitling the undeserved from affirmative
action benefits.0 6 The quadrangle includes Blacks, Asians, Hispanics and
Native Americans and is the quasi-official definition of minorities.0 7 These
classifications vary and are contested across jurisdictions. 108 For example,
Hispanics may include different groups, such as the Spanish but also the
Portuguese who do not even speak Spanish.0 9 Then there are Persians and
Afghanis who are considered to be white and ineligible for affirmative
action."10

102. Krishnaswamy & Khosla, supra note 68 at 58.
103. Anita Indira Anand, "Visible Minorities in the Multi-Racial State: When are Preferential Policies
Justifiable?" (1998) 21 Dal. L.J. 92 [Anand].
104. For example, Anand points out that Japanese and Korean Canadians have high academic grades
and financial resources, experience less unemployment than the average population and are more
concentrated in the professional sector than the average Canadian workforce. On the other hand,
Aboriginals have a high unemployment rate and few complete high school or a university degree;
ibid. at 119-121.
105. Ibid. at 125.
106. Pager, supra note 101 at 303.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.at 304, 313.
110. Ibid.at 315.
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Pager also notes the internal variance within categories. For example,
within the heterogeneous Asian category, he notes that Asian Indians,
Chinese and Japanese people earn bachelors degrees at almost double the
U.S.A. average, occupy twice as many managerial or professional positions

2
as the U.S.A. norm, and own homes valued at double the U.S.A. median."1

However, Cambodian, Laotian, Samoan and Tongan American statistics
show opposite results." 3 These internal variances raise the problem of
the non-disadvantaged usurping jobs or contracts at the expense of the
disadvantaged or the disadvantaged in a "successful" group being excluded

if the group is no longer counted for representative purposes. 4
Saverio Cereste describes the Minority Student Program (MSP) at
Rutgers Law School-Newark which has recruited minorities since 2000,
without an emphasis on race, but rather on economic and educational
hardships.'t' The University of Victoria Law School has similar admissions
categories: the special access applicant and the Aboriginal applicant. The
MSP and Victoria programs examine economic, social and educational
disadvantage, by considering applicants on an individual basis, based
on socioeconomic background, extraordinary family circumstances,
community service, and employment experience. 116 These policies
encompass economic, social and educational disadvantage, and would
therefore exclude a so-called creamy layer amongst racial groups. This
approach seems to mirror most closely the criteria outlined for the OBC
by Justice Reddy in Indra Sawhney 1992.
11l. Ibid. at 308.
112. Ibid. at 308-309.
113. Ibid. at 309. With respect to affirmative action in higher education, Roy L. Brooks remarks
that the Asian racial category usually contains different experiences, cultures and identities not
necessarily represented by the typical Asian affirmative action beneficiary. He provides an example
of the Vietnamese immigrant whose views on American military support for anti-communist groups
would differ in comparison to the third-generation Japanese American, or the immigrant black versus
the slave descendants who he claims have a more critical perspective on campus. These variations
used in affirmative action undermine real diversity, argues Brooks, when race is used as a proxy for
diversity of thought and experience: Roy L. Brooks, "Affirmative Action in Higher Education: What
Canada Can Take from the American Experience" (2005) 23 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 193 at 201202 [Brooks]. These findings are supported by Joanne Barkman who writes that class used as a proxy
for race does not work in affirmative action plans. Barkman further includes Filipino and Vietnamese
Americans as the underrepresented within the Asian category: Joanne Barkman, "Alive and Not Well:
Affirmative Action on Campus" (2008) 55:2 Dissent 49 at 52, 56-57.
114. Pager states that despite "judicial floundering", there is no theory of the "Who Question" in the
U.S.A. and that what is missing is a societal perspective grounded in empirical fact: Pager, supra note
102 at 310, 319.
115. Saverio Cereste, "Minority Inclusion without Race-Based Affirmative Action: An Embodiment
of Justice Powell's Vision" (2001-2002) 18 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 577 at 577 n. 4, 594, 597-600
[Cereste].
116. University of Victoria Law, "Admissions Requirements", online: <http://www.law.uvic.ca/
NEW-Law-site/special access.php>; <http://www.law.uvic.ca/NEW-Law-site/aboriginal.php>.
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Angela Onwuachi-Willig suggests that rather than treating black
applicants for admission to elite colleges and universities as one monolithic
group in the USA, in order to advance the true goals of affirmative action,
admissions officers should consider the ancestral heritage of black
applicants, as affirmative action programs are not reaching legacy blacks
(descendants from slaves), the original targets of the policy.'17
Dalhousie Law School realized an admissions program which
echoes Onuwuachi-Willig's arguments regarding ancestral heritage. The
Indigenous Blacks and Mi'kmaq Initiative (IB&M) was implemented
in 1989 to reduce "structural and systemic discrimination by increasing
the representation of Indigenous Blacks and Mi'kmaq in the legal
profession".118 According to Richard F. Devlin and A. Wayne MacKay,
the motivation for establishing the program was to challenge the racism of
Canadian legal culture, and legal education in particular." 9
The IB&M Initiative does have a quota system, based on percentages
of the Nova Scotian population. 2 ' Each year only twelve students are
admitted to the program: six Black and six Mi'kmaq. 2' Carol Aylward
notes, though, that a true education equity programme would not be quotabased but would admit as many qualified students as applied. 22
Regardless of whether the field is higher education or employment,
race as a group identifier in North America presents problems of over
and underinclusion -as it is an inaccurate indicator of disadvantage.' 23 For
117. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, "The Admission of Legacy Blacks" (2007) 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1141 at
1149, 1160, 1162, 1198 [Onwuachi-Willig]; Boston and Nair-Reichert, supra note 18 at 4.
118. Dalhousie Law School, "IB&M", online: <http://ibandm.law.dal.ca>; the primary focus of the
IB&M Initiative is on students who are Indigenous Black Nova Scotians, those who were born and
raised in Nova Scotia or who have a substantial connection with a historically Black community in
Nova Scotia, or those who were born and raised Mi'kmaq or have a substantial connection with a
Mi'kmaw community in Mi'maqi.
119. Richard F. Devlin & A. Wayne MacKay, "An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The
Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School" (1991-1992) 14 Dal. L.J. 296
at 304.
120. Carol Aylward, "Adding Colour - A Critique of 'An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The
Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School' (1995) 8 Can. J. Women & L.
470 at 472 [Aylward].
121. Aylward at 472; email communication, Professor Michelle Williams (25 August 2008).
122. Aylward at 472. A comparable program was the Akitsiraq Law School which was a partnered
initiative with the University of Victoria Law School. This was a one-time program which commenced
in 2001 and offered a Bachelor of Laws to Inuit students only, at the Nunavut Arctic College. The
program was initiated as a response to the growing need for Inuit lawyers in the practice of law in
Nunavut, online: <http://www.law.uvic.ca/akits.html>; see also Kelly Gallagher-Mackay, "Affirmative
Action and Aboriginal Government: The Case for Legal Education in Nunavut" (1999) 14:2 Can J.L.
& Soc. 21.
123. Andrew Koppelman and Donald Rebstock remark that "truly individualized consideration
is impossible," see: Andrew Koppelman & Donald Rebstock, "On Affirmative Action and 'Truly
Individualized Consideration"' (2007) 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1469 at 1469.
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these reasons, an affirmative action plan based on alleviating disadvantage
which targets a racial group should be closely examined to verify whether
the group as a whole is truly disadvantaged or if only certain individuals
are.
Caste and race
Before discussing the Supreme Court of Canada cases, it is instructive to
examine whether there are any parallels between race and caste, in order
to compare Canadian categories of race to the Indian classifications based
on caste. Laura Dudley Jenkins claims that caste and race are both related
to birth, involve notions of purity and can result in social and occupation
segregation. 24 She has compared the SC in India to the African-Americans
in the U.S.A., the ST to the Amercian-Indians because both are indigenous
and a culturally distinct group with special rights, and Hispanics to the
OBCs, as they vary by ethnicity, national origin and heritage, language,
name, or racial appearance.125 Likewise, Sumit Sarkar argues that race-like
situations and conflicts exist in South Asia if one defines race as widespread
essentialization of an Other, its inferiorization, and the ascription of
126
qualities to be inherent, ineluctably hereditary, or biological.
There are also differences between caste and race which are not as
easily linked. Race is an immutable characteristic. 127 Caste, on the other
hand, is not. 128 A person is black and continues to be black regardless of
status and wealth.' 29 However, given caste mobility, people move from
one job to another in their lifetime and over generations. 30 A percentage
of government services in India are now occupied by the descendants
of low castes.' 3' Furthermore, when a SC person leaves the village to
work in an urban centre, there is anonymity, an opportunity to obtain a
government job, or prospects of upward mobility. 3 2 As a result, some who
were descendants of untouchables are no longer untouchables, thereby
demonstrating that caste is a mutable characteristic.' 33

124. Jenkins, "Race," supra note 18 at 752-753.
125. Ibid. at 753.
126. Sumit Sarkar, "The Relevance of the Language of Race in South Asian Conflicts" in Rik Pinxten
& Ellen Precker, eds., Racism in MetropolitanAreas (New York: Berghahn Books 2006) 73.
127. Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and NorthernAffairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at para. 13
[Corbiere];Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 at para. 67.
128. Gupta, "Politics," supra note 20 at 63.
129. Ibid. at 59, 63.
130. Ibid. at 63-64; Galanter, supranote 18 at 12.
131. Gupta, "Politics," supra note 20 at 63.
132. Ibid. at 65.
133. Ibid. at 63-64.
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It has been argued that race in certain societies is arranged along a
spectrum of colours from white to black -being closer to white is superior.'34
On the other hand, people of a caste would not agree on a social hierarchy.
One caste would not accept itself as less pure than another, but they would
all agree that Brahmins are at the top. 35
Because caste has some parallels to race as a category, it is informative
to look to Supreme Court ofIndiajurisprudence on the creamy layer concept
and the importance of carving out the truly disadvantaged as beneficiaries
of affirmative action programs. However, it must be remembered that not
only groups who belong to a Hindu caste are included within the OBC
category. 31 6 Caste is only one consideration when determining who belongs
to the OBC. 3 7 Further, the OBC contain groups who are historically and
currently disadvantaged in a similar manner in which certain racial groups
have been and are disadvantaged in Canada.
Finally, the Supreme Court of India has explained that caste is not
equated with class in the Marxist sense; rather, backward classes denote
a social class. In a similar manner, racial groups sometimes denote a
disadvantaged class in multi-racial societies. For these reasons, I would
argue that Supreme Court of India decisions regarding the creamy layer
and OBCs are relevant to the affirmative action debate in Canada and
future litigation concerning s. 15(2) of the Canadian Charter and the
ground of race.
II. The context in Canada
Canadaand affirmative action
Unlike in India, in Canada specific groups are not guaranteed constitutional
protection in employment, education or against discrimination in general.
The only race-based category regarding rights and freedoms is found in
s. 25 of the CanadianCharterand s. 35 of ConstitutionAct, 1982 which
name "aboriginal peoples of Canada" and include Indians, Inuit, and
Mtis.'38 However, other ethnic or racial groups are also protected against
discrimination by s. 15 of the Canadian Charter.Consequently, the two
Supreme Court of Canada decisions on s. 15(2) discussed affirmative

134. Ibid. at 59-61.
135. Ibid. at 61.
136. Indra Sawhney 1992, supra note 12, and Thakur 2008, supra note 9.
137. Ibid.
138. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-5 [Indian Act]
specifies that it does not apply to the Inuit. Section 4(1) states: A reference in this Act to an Indian
does not include any person of the race of aborigines commonly referred to as lnuit.
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action policies which were implemented for the benefit of Aboriginal
people: Lovelace v. Ontario,3 9 and R. v. Kapp.4 °
Supreme Court of Canadas. 15(2) Charterjurisprudence
Until recently, there was only one case from the Supreme Court of Canada
regarding Canada's constitutional provision on affirmative action. Lovelace
v. Ontariowas the Supreme Court of Canada's first pronouncement on and
interpretation of s. 15(2) of the CanadianCharter.
In Canada, the concept of affirmative action is still controversial. It
is not assumed that a government program will be immune from judicial
scrutiny merely on the claim that the plan is aimed at ameliorating the
disadvantaged. The intentions are judicially examined. Lovelace and Kapp
provide two divergent approaches to interpreting s. 15(2) and examining
the constitutional validity of an affirmative action program. Both cases
involved Aboriginal groups who were the beneficiaries of government
programs which aimed at economic amelioration. However, the economic
goals were related to the social and cultural advancement of Aboriginal
communities and not mere poverty alleviation.
Lovelace introduced the problem of competing group demands within
the context of constitutionally sanctioned affirmative action. The case.
is unusual in that the appellant and the beneficiary of the respondent's
affirmative action program both belonged to a disadvantaged racial group
which is constitutionally recognized:. Aboriginals. 4' However, it was
the Kapp court which acknowledged that the comparator groups were
differentiated on the basis of race.
Lovelace v. Ontario (2001)
In Lovelace the appellants were members of various First Nation
communities who sought access to the proceeds (First Nations Fund) of
Ontario's first reserve-based casino.'42 In the 1990s, various First Nations
bands approached the Ontario government for the right to control reservebased gaming activities and use the proceeds towards strengthening band

139. [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 [Lovelace].
140. 2008 SCC 41 [Kapp].
141. James Hendry notes that the fact that Aboriginals are constitutionally recognized may not have
influenced the Lovelace analysis; in his opinion the same could have followed if the groups were
disabled persons: email communication, James Hendry (27 March 2009).
142. Indian Act, supra note 138 at s. 2(1), states a "reserve means a tract of land, the legal title to
which is vested in Her Majesty, that has been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a
band." This includes designated lands, except as specified in ss. 18(2), 20-25, 28, 36-38, 42, 44, 46,
48-51, 58-60, and the regulations made under any of these provisions.
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economic, social and cultural development. 143 The Ontario government
informed the appellants in 1996 that only Ontario First Nations
communities registered as bands under the Indian Act could receive the
casino's proceeds. Since the appellant communities were not registered
as bands, were non-status and did not have reserve lands, they were not
entitled to proceeds from the First Nations Fund.
The appellants argued that Ontario's refusal to include them in the First
Nations Fund negotiations violated their equality rights under s. 15(1) and
that s. 15(2) could not be invoked as a defence. The Attorney General of
Ontario (AGO) argued that s. 15(2) did act as a defence to any claim of a
violation of s. 15(1). The Court decided that s. 15(2) did not in fact act as a
defence, but that the impugned government program should be evaluated
in terms of the s. 15(1) analysis articulated in Law v. Canada.'"
Justice Iacobucci delivered the unanimous seven-judge decision. He
stated that the determination of discrimination should be interpreted in4a5
purposive and contextual manner to realize s. 15(1)'s remedial purpose.
This inquiry is to establish whether a conflict exists between the purpose
and effect of an impugned law and the purpose of s. 15(1).146 The central
goal of the provision is to protect against the violation of essential human
dignity, as described in Law.
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the relative disadvantage
approach which would assess the claimant in relation to a comparator
group. 1 47 This approach would be inappropriate in Lovelace, since the
48
claimants and the comparator groups are both historically disadvantaged.1
Assessing relative disadvantage would also be inconsistent with the
substantive equality analysis and would pit one disadvantaged group
149
against another.

143. Ibid.at s. 2(1), defines a "'band' [as] a body of Indians (a) for whose use and benefit in common,
lands, the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty, have been set apart before, on or after September
4, 1951, (b) for whose use and benefit in common, moneys are held by Her Majesty, or (c) declared by
the Governor in Council to be a band for the purposes of this Act", and "[a]n 'Indian' means a person
who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to be registered as an Indian."
144. Lawv. Canada(MinisterofEmployment andImmigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law];Lovelace,
supra note 139 at paras. 91, 96-97, 105, 108.
145. Lovelace, ibid.at paras. 53-55: 1) does the law, program or activity imposes differential treatment
between the claimant and others; 2) is this differential treatment based on one or more enumerated or
analogous grounds; and 3) does theimpugned law, program or activity have a purpose or effect that is
substantively discriminatory?
146. Ibid. at paras. 53-55.
147. Ibid. at para. 59.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
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Although distinctions may be discriminatory, substantive equality
may require such distinctions to take into account the actual circumstance
of an individual with social, political and economic situations. 150 The
appropriate comparator and the contextual factors must be evaluated from
the reasonable perspective of the claimant. 5' As a result, s. 15(1) is to
prevent discrimination but also to ameliorate conditions for disadvantaged
persons.152 lacobucci J. further noted that the concept ofunderinclusiveness
within the context of equality to this point in jurisprudence has only dealt
53
with benefit schemes, but that underinclusiveness may violate equality.1
With respect to the appropriate comparator groups, because of the
diversity in living conditions for the parties, lacobucci J. concluded that
they would be band and non-band Aboriginal communities.
On the differential treatment and grounds question, the Ba-WabBon appellants claimed that they were excluded on the basis of race and
ethnicity. The Lovelace party claimed that non-registration under the
Indian Act is tied to a longstanding cultural, community and personal
identity of a group of individuals constituting a discrete and insular
minority within the larger Aboriginal population. They further argued that
their exclusion is constructively immutable given the onerous nature of
federal policies relating to band registration. Iacobucci J. did not engage
in a determination of the grounds of discrimination, as he found that there
was no discrimination. However, he did conclude that there was differential
treatment since the province of Ontario confirmed on 2 May 1996 that the
appellants were excluded from a share in the First Nations Fund and any
related negotiation process.
Regarding the contextual analysis of discrimination, Lacobucci J.
concluded that no discrimination existed through the operation of the
casino program. 154
Pre-existingdisadvantage,stereotyping,prejudice,or vulnerability
lacobucci J. recalled that this is not a race to the bottom and that the
claimants are not required to show that they are more disadvantaged than
the comparator group.'5 5 All Aboriginal people suffer from stereotyping,
prejudice, high rates of unemployment and poverty, and disadvantage
in relation to education, health and housing. 5 6 However, as the Court
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Ibid. at
Ibid. at
Ibid. at
Ibid.
Ibid. at
Ibid. at
Ibid.

para. 60.
para. 55.
para. 60.
para. 68.
para. 69.
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states, the two appellant groups face unique disadvantages from being
excluded from the IndianAct: "(i) a vulnerability to cultural assimilation;
(ii) a compromised ability to protect their relationship with traditional
homelands; (iii) a lack of access to culturally-specific health, educational,
pattern of being ignored by
and social service programs; and (iv) a chronic
157
governments."'
provincial
and
federal
both
The appellants further added that these disadvantages were exacerbated
by the stereotype that they are "less aboriginal" and less worthy of
recognition than other Aboriginal peoples. Iacobucci J. accepted that
the appellants were stereotyped but found that the appellants failed to
establish that the First Nations Fund stereotyped against them.'58 The
distinction corresponded to the situation of the individuals it affected and
the exclusion did not undermine the ameliorative purpose of the program.
The First Nations Fund did not conflict with s. 15(l). "'
Correspondence,or lack thereof between the ground(s)on which the
claim is basedand the actual need, capacity,or circumstancesof the
claimant or others
Iacobucci J. stated that there is a high degree of correspondence between the
program and the actual needs, circumstances and capacities of the bands. 6 °
It is necessary to recognize how the First Nations Fund is embedded in
the overall casino project. 161 The province did not unilaterally allocate the
First Nations Fund from its consolidated revenue pool; it was a partnered
initiative with representatives of the First Nations bands having significant
decision-making input. The program was designed to address several
issues: "(i) to reconcile the differing positions of the province and First
Nations bands with respect to the need to regulate reserve-based gambling
activities;. (ii) to support the development of a government-to-government
relationship between First Nations bands and the provincial government;
and (iii) to ameliorate the social, cultural and economic conditions of band
communities."' 62 The program's focus was also on resolving outstanding
163
gambling issues with these Aboriginal communities.

157. Ibid. at para. 70.
158. Ibid. at paras. 71-73.
159. Ibid. at para. 73.
160. Ibid. at para. 82. James Hendry remarks that where there are two groups that could equally
benefit from a program which could be characterized as underinclusive, the correspondence factor will
act as a tie-breaker: email communication, James Hendry (27 March 2009).
161. Ibid. at para. 74.
162. Ibid
163. Ibid at para. 77.
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lacobucci J. acknowledged that the appellants had similar needs to
ameliorate the poor social, cultural and economic conditions in their
communities. However, he distinguished this claim on the basis that the
correspondence consideration requires more than establishing a common
need. 16' If common need were the basis of the programs, government
would be placed in the position of ranking populations without paying
attention to the unique circumstances and capabilities of potential program
beneficiaries.1 65 The appellants did not have a land base, due to cultural
considerations and exclusion from the Indian Act regime.1 66 On the other
hand, the Casino was designed to be located on a reserve due to limited
economic opportunities on-reserve and constraints on land use under the
67
Indian Act.1
The ameliorativepurpose or effects of the impugned law, programor
activity upon a more disadvantagedperson or group in society
As this case dealt with the claimant and targeted group both being
disadvantaged; lacobucci J. extended the ameliorative purpose analysis
to include the excluded group in a situation of disadvantage. In this case,
the allegations were that the ameliorative program is underinclusive. As
a result, exclusion from the program would be less likely to be associated
with stereotyping or stigmatization or conveying the message that the
168
excluded group is less worthy of recognition in the larger society.
lacobucci J. concluded that the ameliorative purpose of the casino
program and the First Nations Fund had been established: the First Nations
Fund would provide bands with fiscal resources to ameliorate social, health,
cultural, education and economic disadvantages. This would also assist in
supporting the bands in self-government and self-reliance and to remove
historical disadvantage and enhance the dignity and recognition of bands
in Canadian society. 69 lacobucci J. found that the First Nations Fund had
a purpose consistent with s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter and that the
exclusion of the appellants did not undermine this purpose, since it was
not associated with a misconception as to their actual needs, capacities and
70
circumstances. 1

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Ibid. at para. 75.
Ibid.
Ibid. at paras. 75-76.
Ibid. at para. 76.
Ibid. at para. 86.
Ibid. at para. 87.
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The nature and scope of the interestaffected by the impugned
government activity
Finally, lacobucci J. found that the First Nations Fund did not demean the
71
appellants' human dignity. 1

The relationshipbetween s. 15(1) and (2)
Justice Iacobucci stated that the parties' concerns were addressed by the
s. 15(1) analysis itself and in particular, the correspondence factor.'17 The
respondent submitted that s. 15(2) acts independently to protect ameliorative
programs and that the Canadian Chartershould be interpreted to support
the amelioration of specific targeted groups. lacobucci J. explained that
the court was to deal with two competing approaches to understand the
application of s. 15(2): one where s. 15(2) is an interpretive aid to s. 15(1)
and the other where s. 15(2) is an exemption or defence to the applicability
of the s. 15(1) discrimination analysis.' 73
Another interpretation stems from the decision of Roberts from the
Ontario Court of Appeal which dealt with s. 14(1) (the affirmative action
provision) of the Ontario Human Rights Code.'74 Given the need to promote
substantive equality, s. 14(1) could only be invoked as an exemptive clause
in situations where a rational connection exists between the prohibited
ground of discrimination and the program. '75 lacobucci J. noted that the
"rational connection" test in Roberts "squarely matches" the approach in
76
examining the "correspondence factor" in the contextual analysis. 1
In conclusion, lacobucci J. stated that the plain meaning of the language
in these subsections is that s. 15(2) is confirmatory and supplementary to
s. 15(1). The s. 15(2) phrase "does not preclude" cannot be understood
as language of defence or exemption, but rather that s. 15(1) includes a
special program. Section 15(2) also acts as an interpretive aid to s. 15(1)
to ensure internal coherence of the CanadianCharter.177 This also allows
the possibility of a s. 1 review. Justice Jacobucci cautioned, though, that

171. Ibid. at paras. 88-90.
172. Ibid. at para. 92.
173. Ibid. at para. 97.
174. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Ontario(1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 387 (Ont. C.A.) [Roberts];
Human Rights Code, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.19; s. 14(1), as rep. by An Act to Repeal Job Quotas and to
Restore Merit-Based Employment Practicesin Ontario,S.O. 1995, c. 4, s. 3(1): a right under Part I is
not infringed by the implementation of a special program designed to relieve hardship or economic
disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal
opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part 1.
175. Lovelace, supra note 139 at para. 99.
176. Ibid. at para. 100.
177. Ibid. at para. 106.
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future equality jurisprudence may find that s. 15(2) may be independently
applicable to a case.'
lacobucci J. commented on the design of the government program
and how it was established to ameliorate the social, cultural and economic
conditions of band communities, which clearly related to the goals or object
of the program. However, Lacobucci J. still did not refer to the language of
s. 15(2) where it states "has as its object."
This almost invisible role of s. 15(2) is further highlighted in the
ameliorative purpose factor ("the ameliorative purpose or effects of the
impugned law, program or activity upon a more disadvantaged person
or group in society"). This factor would appear to be the most relevant
one for the Court to refer to in an analysis under s. 15(2) since the word
"ameliorative" is also found in its text. Instead, lacobucci J. limited the
analysis of ameliorative purpose to s. 15(1) to avoid measuring relative
disadvantage between the competing disadvantaged groups.
There is no guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada in Lovelace
as to how race in particular as a ground of discrimination would be treated
under s. 15(2). Iacobucci J. did not determine the grounds of discrimination,
as he had already concluded that there was no discrimination. Thus,
whether the appellants in Lovelace were truly disadvantaged, based on a
distinction within the Aboriginal category, was not examined.
Nevertheless, Lacobucci J. provides some direction as to how
Aboriginal people as a race might be regarded in an affirmative action
challenge based on equality. From the facts of the case, the casino program
was not solely an economic initiative. Although it was to generate income
for the Aboriginal bands, the income was to uplift the social, cultural and
economic conditions of the band members. Likewise, in the Indian context,
reservations for the OBC/SC/ST were not designed to alleviate poverty.
They were implemented to uplift social and educational backwardness,
but which were linked to economic backwardness.
R. v. Kapp (2008) and the revival of s. 15(2)
The Supreme Court of Canada recently pronounced on the preferred
approach ofa s. 15(2) analysis in the decision of R. v. Kapp. 7 9 This is only
the second time s. 15(2) has been judicially considered by the Supreme
Court of Canada. 8 Kapp was a criminal matter in which the appellants
claimed a violation of their equality rights. The Supreme Court of Canada's
178. Ibid. at paras. 100, 108.
179. Kapp, supra note 140.
180. However, Justice Wilson touched on the purpose of s. 15(2) in her dissenting reasons in Harrison
v. University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451.
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nine judges were unanimous in upholding a government program which
targeted Aboriginal fishers in British Columbia at the exclusion of nonAboriginals. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella delivered the
majority reasons for judgment.
The Kapp court's approach to s. 15(2) differed greatly from Lovelace.
The Supreme Court of Canada attached relevance to s. 15(2) by giving it
an independent role in the Canadian Charter.8' The bench noted that the
third factor from Law (whether the law or program has an ameliorative
purpose or effect) relates to the meaning of s. 15(2), whereas lacobucci J.
stated that the second factor of correspondence under s. 15(1) related to
any arguments which were raised by the Attorney General of Ontario, such
as s. 15(2) having an independent role to play in protecting ameliorative
programs.
The respondent federal government [Crown] initiated a policy to
give Aboriginal people a share of the commercial fishery. The Aboriginal
Fisheries Strategy included pilot sales programs which issued communal
fishing licenses pursuant to the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences
Regulations'82 [ACFLR]. The ACFLR grant communal licences to
"aboriginal organizations" which are defined as including "an Indian band,
an Indian band council, a tribal council and an organization that represents a
territorially based Aboriginal community."' 83 The licence permitted fishers
designated by the bands to fish for sockeye salmon between 7h00 on 19
August 1998, and 7h00 20 August 1998, and to use the fish caught for
food, social and ceremonial purposes and for sale.' 84 Some of the fishers
were also licensed commercial fishers entitled to fish at other openings for
85
commercial fishers.
The appellants were commercial fishers who were excluded from the
86
fishery during the 24 hours allocated to the licensed Aboriginal fishers.
They participated in a protest fishery during the prohibited period and
were charged with fishing during a prohibited time. 8 7 They argued that the
A CFLR, related regulations, and the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy violated
88
their s. 15 equality rights on the basis of race.

181. Note that this was the government's position in Lovelace.
182. Kapp,supra note 140 at para. 7; S.O.R./93-332 [ACFLR].
183. Ibid. at para. 7.
184. Ibid. atpara. 8.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid. at para. 9. These commercial fishers were also licensed to fish in Area "E": Supreme Court
of Canada, Factum of the Respondent, Her Majesty the Queen, in Kapp, ibid. at para. 7.
187. Ibid. at para. 9.
188. Ibid. at para. 2.
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The Crown asserted that the general purpose of the licensing program
was to regulate the fishery and ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged
group. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and upheld the
constitutional validity of the licensing program. 18 9
The s. 15(2) analysis
The Court emphasized that ss. 15(1) and (2) are a pair in promoting
substantive equality. 90 Section 15(1) is an anti-discriminatory provision. 191
It aims to prevent discriminatory distinctions that impact adversely on
the enumerated groups or the groups based on analogous grounds. ' 92 An
additional mechanism to combat discrimination is through s. 15(2) which
enables the government to develop programs to help disadvantaged groups,
without the fear of a s. 15(1) challenge. 193
The Court recalled the test in Law: "(1) pre-existing disadvantage,
if any, of the claimant group; (2) degree of correspondence between the
differential treatment and the claimant group's reality; (3) whether the law
or program has an ameliorative purpose or effect; and (4) the nature of the
interest affected."' 194 The Court suggested that the third factor relates to the
meaning of s. 15(2).195

The Court also stated that under Andrews (the seminal Supreme Court
of Canada case on s. 15(1)), s. 15 does not mean identical treatment, as
identical treatment may produce inequality. 196 Differential treatment
is not necessarily discriminatory, and likewise not every distinction is
discriminatory. 197 As such, programs designed to ameliorate disadvantaged
groups will inevitably exclude individuals or other groups, but will not
1 98
amount to "reverse discrimination.'
The Court accepted the appellants' claim that they were treated
differently on the basis of the enumerated ground of race. 9 9 Next, the Court
accepted that the communal fishing licence which was issued pursuant to
the ACFLR qualified as a law, program or activity within the meaning of
s. 15(2).200 The final question was whether the licence "has as its object
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Ibid. at para. 3.
Ibid at para. 16.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.at paras. 16, 25.
Ibid.atpara. 19.
Ibid.atpara. 23.
Ibid. at para. 27; Andrews v.Law Society of British Cohmbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
Kapp, paras. 27-28.
Ibid.atpara. 28.
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Ibid. at para. 30.
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the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups. '
Thus, the Court launched into a s. 15(2) analysis, without examining the
program under s. 15(1) first.
The Court reiterated that the purpose of s. 15(2) is remedial and
enables state efforts to develop schemes which assist disadvantaged
groups, especially given the phrase "does not preclude" in the provision. 2
If the government can demonstrate that an impugned program meets the
criteria of s. 15(2), it may be unnecessary to conduct a s. 15(1) analysis at
all.20 3 The Court recalled that since s. 15(1) prevents discrimination and s.
15(2) enables governments to pro-actively combat discrimination, the two
provisions confirm each other and promote substantive equality. 0 4 Most
importantly, the Court stated that s. 15(2) "supports a full expression of
equality, rather than derogating from it."2 5 The justices thus endorsed an
individual role for s. 15(2) within the context of the equality guarantee.
In order to interpret s. 15(2) appropriately, the Court stated that s. 15(1)
should be read in a manner that does not find an ameliorative program
aimed at combating disadvantage to be discriminatory and a breach of
s. 15.206 The Court rejected the previous approach to s. 15(2) where a
program would be found discriminatory before saving it as ameliorative.0 7
The Court reversed the steps in the analysis and stated that if a government
fails to demonstrate that a program falls under s. 15(2), the program should
then be scrutinized under s. 15(1) for discrimination.2 8
Therefore, the Court outlined the s. 15(2) test as follows:
A program does not violate the s. 15 equality guarantee if the government
can demonstrate that: (1) the program has an ameliorative or remedial
group identified by
purpose; and (2) the program targets a 2disadvantaged
9
the enumerated or analogous grounds.
The Court qualified the test by stating that it is subject to future refinement,
since s. 15(2) jurisprudence is still developing." 0
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Next, the majority provided an interpretation of three phrases/
terms within the text of s. 15(2) as part of its analysis: has as its object;
amelioration; and disadvantaged.
"Has as its object"
The Court inquired as to whether a court should look to the purpose or
the effect of the impugned legislation and whether a program should have
an ameliorative purpose as its sole object. With respect to the sole object
question, the Court found no justification for requiring a program to have
amelioration as it sole purpose, since several goals may be implemented
21
in a scheme. 1
The Court favoured a purpose-based approach based on the language on
the provision and goal of enabling governments to combat discrimination.
The question to ask is "was the government's goal in creating that distinction
to improve the conditions of a group that is disadvantaged?"2 t 2 The Court
suggested that in order to determine this intention, it may be necessary
to consider statements made by drafters of a program and "whether the
legislature chose means rationally related to that ameliorative purpose, in
the sense that it appears at least plausible that the program may indeed
213
advance the stated goal of combatting disadvantage.
In order to prevent the inquiry from becoming effect-based, the Court
suggested that the analysis should be framed as follows:
Was it rational for the state to conclude that the means chosen to reach its
ameliorative goal would contribute to that purpose? For the distinction
to be rational, there must be a correlation between the program and the
disadvantage suffered by the target group. Such a standard permits
significant deference to the legislature but allows judicial review where
a program nominally seeks to serve 21the
disadvantaged but in practice
4
serves other non-remedial objectives.
"Amelioration"
Based on different applications and perhaps misuse of the term amelioration
by past courts, the Supreme Court of Canada advised that this term should
be given careful attention in evaluating programs under s. 15(2).21 5 For
guidance, they suggested that laws which are designed to restrict or
punish behaviour would not qualify for s. 15(2) protection and that the
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focus should not be on the effect of a law.216 If a law has no plausible or
predictable ameliorative effect, it may also not qualify for protection.217
"Disadvantaged"
The Court stated that the term disadvantaged encompasses vulnerability,
prejudice and negative social characterization.2 18 They further distinguished
the purpose of s. 15(2) from broad societal legislation: the first protects a
specified and targeted disadvantaged group, whereas the latter may take
the form of a social assistance program, for example. 2 19 Finally, not all
members of the group need to be disadvantaged if the group as a whole has
experienced discrimination. 220 Notably, this definition of "disadvantaged"
appears to relate to the Indian description of social backwardness and the
classification of a group as backward.
In applying the s. 15(2) analysis to the facts before them, the Court
found that the fishing licence related to the goals of negotiating solutions
to the Aboriginal fishing rights claims, the provision of economic
opportunities to native bands and supporting their self-sufficiency.221
These goals addressed the social and economic disadvantage of the native
bands, which rooted in history, continues to exist.222 As such, the means
chosen to achieve the purpose of the program were rationally connected
and corresponded to the purpose. 223 The Court reiterated that because some
individual members of the bands may not experience disadvantage, this
does not negate the group disadvantage suffered. 224 As a result, the Court
found the government program to be constitutional.
The Kapp test places the onus of proof on the government to show that
the ameliorative program meets the s. 15(2) criteria. In Lovelace, the onus
was on the applicants to show whether the government program violated
s. 15. If there is a violation, it appears as though the justification would be
contained in the correspondence factor as a rational connection test, under
s. 15(1), however, Iacobucci J. noted that this approach allows for a s. 1
review. 226 Based on either legal test, it is unclear whether any s. 1 analysis
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would ever be required or if it is subsumed by the two-part test within s.
15(2).
Michael Peirce has suggested that because s. 15(2) does not guarantee
a right or a freedom, s. 1 is not engaged. 227 According to Peirce, if an
ancillary feature of a government program is found to be underinclusive
and reviewed by s. 15(1), that feature may be upheld by s. 1.228 The Kapp
court explained that if a program fails under s. 15(2) that it can then receive
s. 15(1) scrutiny, however, they did not discuss any further application of s.
1. At this point, it appears as though s. 15(2) contains an internal balancing
which would not necessitate any s. 1 analysis.
With respect to how a government affirmative action program should
be reviewed, it is unclear whether the Court would use a subjective or
objective test. The Court in Kapp suggested that the intention of the drafters
of the program should be examined in order to determine "whether the
legislature chose means rationally related to that ameliorative purpose, in
the sense that it appears at least plausible that the program may indeed
advance the stated goal of combating disadvantage" (my emphasis).
The word "rationally" implies an objective test; what a reasonable
person would find rational. However, the words "plausible" and "may"
appear to import a quasi-subjective test into the question of whether the
government program meets its goal. Inevitably, the Court is forced to
examine in a hypothetical fashion whether the program's purpose would
have the effect of combating disadvantage, despite the Court stressing that
the focus should be .solely purpose based. In this manner, s. 15(2) is a
unique provision in that the court must look at some evidence which is
based on the government's intent, but not at hard data on the effects of the
affirmative action program in order to conclude whether it is constitutional.
Normally, such a record would be considered to be incomplete.
The Kapp court has breathed life into a constitutional provision
which up until this decision was left motionless and underutilized by
the Supreme Court of Canada. From a preliminary examination, the
revival of s. 15(2) appears to be more applicant friendly than the legal
test formulated in Lovelace. First, the burden of proof is now on the
government to demonstrate that its affirmative action programs truly
are aimed at combating disadvantage. This eases some of the evidence
gathering necessities facing an applicant. Second, the steps enunciated
by the Kapp court in assessing whether a government program meets s.
227. Michael Peirce, "A Progressive Interpretation of Subsection 15(2) of the Charter" (1993) 57
Sask. L. Rev. 263 at 313 [Peirce].
228. Ibid.
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15(2) requirements are clear. The components of the legal test reflect the
actual text of s. 15(2). This renders the provision perhaps more intuitive
and more easily interpreted by the reader. Third, based on the legal test
for s. 15(2), it seems that although the Court will scrutinize a government
program for constitutional validity, because the Court will look to the
purpose and the intent of the program, they will be mindful of deferring to
the government.
Based on these changes, it is apparent that every challenge to a
government program under s. .15(2) will not necessarily be successful
merely because it is underinclusive. This was also acknowledged by
lacobucci J. when he stated that the exclusion of the appellants did not
undermine the purpose of the casino project because it did not misconceive
their actual needs, capacities and circumstances, although he was referring
solely to s. 15(1). This allows the government the freedom and space to
create ameliorative programs for selected groups, even though they may
exclude others. Rather than having a chilling effect then, the Kapp decision
might indirectly encourage governments to implement more affirmative
action programs.
A Canadiancreamy layer?
The Lovelace Court rejected the relative disadvantage approach for
appropriate reasons; there should not be a race to the bottom between
disadvantaged groups in order to become beneficiaries of government
goods. This is indeed valid reasoning for a diverse society. However,
this language possibly forecloses the opportunity to examine whether a
creamy layer exists within the Aboriginal category or any racial category,
or whether one should even be delineated. But it is not clear that the
Lovelace Court had closed the door to a creamy layer analysis.
lacobucci J. noted that an equality challenge must be assessed from
the reasonable perspective of the claimant in conjunction with human
dignity. The appellants in Lovelace argued that apart from disadvantages
suffered by all Aboriginals, their circumstances were exacerbated by
the stereotype that they are "less aboriginal" and less worthy than other
Aboriginal peoples because they lived off-reserve and were not registered
band communities or non-status Indians and M~tis. They also argued that
they were differentiated by the Attorney General of Ontario on the basis of
race and ethnicity, along with being non-registered Indians. They claimed
that their exclusion was constructively immutable given the federal band
registration regime.
The Lovelace Court did not discuss whether the appellant Aboriginals
had immutable characteristics, however this would have been an instructive
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inquiry as it may have placed certain Aboriginal peoples in an "immutable"
racial or ethnic category of their own within the s. 15(1) list, whereas
race generally is an immutable characteristic and an enumerated ground
22 9
of discrimination.
lacobucci J. acknowledged that the casino program involved a question
ofunderinclusiveness. The appellants wanted to be included in the program
but were excluded due to their status and the nature of their outstanding
issues with the government. But they were not excluded based on any
constitutional definition of Aboriginal. Section 35 of the ConstitutionAct,
1982 states that Aboriginals are Indians, Inuit, and Mdtis. The exclusion
the appellants referred to was partially based on the requirements of the
Indian Act. However, based on the facts of Lovelace, these distinctions do
not appear to be permanent prejudicial characteristics. Since the casino
program was aimed at a certain type of Aboriginal group and a certain
type of problem, such as gambling, it appears that there is no permanent
hierarchy within the Aboriginal category or a creamy layer.
Framed within the Indian context, the appellants perhaps had an
argument that within the racial category of Aboriginal, the status Indians,
members of registered bands and on-reserve Indians were the creamy layer
of the Aboriginals. However, what then would the criteria for the creamy
layer be? Would the criteria merely be belonging to a band, living on-reserve
and being status Indian? These factors could be compared to the social,
educational and economic criteria required for OBC identification. But
based on Lovelace, should there even be a creamy layer for Aboriginals?
The rationale for excluding the creamy layer in India is to identify
the true OBCs. It is also necessary because there are limited goods and
services which need to be preserved for the truly disadvantaged; seats for
higher education and government employment. These scarce resources are
inevitably linked to perceived or real economic prosperity. In the case of
Lovelace, although the casino program was created to generate income,
the resources required to implement the program are not unlimited.
The government could enter into other agreements with the appellant
Aboriginal groups regarding economic activity or self-government,
however, they would be required to be selective. As noted by lacobucci
J., the casino program was not just a targeted ameliorative program, it was
2 31
also a partnered initiative and not a benefits scheme.
Similarly, in Kapp, the fishing licenses related to a limited natural
resource. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans manages the salmon
229. See above discussion on caste and race in Part II.
230. Lovelace, supra note 139 at para. 82.
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fishery for the good of all Canadians and allocates this scarce resource
among different user groups-commercial fishers, Aboriginal communities
" '
and recreational fishers.23
There is perhaps a link between Canadian Aboriginals and the ST in
India, but not the OBC. As noted above, Jenkins has compared the ST.
to American Indians in the U.S.A., because both are indigenous and a
culturally distinct group with special rights. In Canada, Aboriginal peoples
are indigenous, have various distinct cultures and are afforded special rights
under the Canadian Charter and the Constitution Act, 1982. However,
they also have a historically distinct geography and unique relationship
with the government.2 32
The ST are not defined in the Indian Constitution, however there are
generally accepted criteria published on the Ministry of Tribal Affairs'
website for determining who will be added/removed from the ST State lists,
based on definitions from previous committees and commissions.233 The
ST are considered to be the most disadvantaged, along with the SC.234 For
a community to be specified as ST, there must be indications of primitive
traits, distinctive culture, geographical isolation, shyness of contact with
the community at large, and backwardness.2 35 There is no comparable
definition of Aboriginals under the Indian Act in Canada, however, the
link which can be drawn is that the ST and Aboriginals in Canada may
both be considered as indigenous groups which are not necessarily part

231. Supreme Court of Canada, Factum of the Respondent, Her Majesty the Queen, in Kapp, supra
note 140 at para. 1.
232. See Corbiere,supra note 127, and R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
233. Government of India, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, online: <http://www.tribal.nic.in/index.asp>.
These criteria are based on definitions in the 1931 census, reports of the first Backward Classes
Commission 1955, the Advisory Committee (Kalekar), on the revision of SC/ST lists (Lokur
Committee) 1965, and the Joint Committee of Parliament in the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes orders (Amendment) Bill 1967 (Chanda Committee), 1969. No community has been specified
as Scheduled Tribe in relation to the State of Haryana and Punjab and Union Territories of Chandigarh,
Delhi and Pondicherry.
A Scheduled Area is not defined in the Indian Constitution. The criteria followed for declaring an
area as Scheduled Area are preponderance of tribal population; compactness and reasonable size
of the area; under-developed nature of the area; and marked disparity in economic standard of the
people. These criteria embody principles followed in declaring "Excluded" and "Partially-Excluded
Areas" under the Government of India Act 1935, Schedule "B" of recommendations of the Excluded
and Partially Excluded Areas Sub Committee of Constituent Assembly and the Scheduled Areas and
Scheduled Tribes Commission 1961.
There is also a presumption of backwardness based on residence in exclusive territorial communities:
Paramanand Singh, "Some Reflections on Indian Experience with Policy of Reservation" (1983) 25
J.I.L.I. 46 at 47.
234. Cunningham, "Race," supra note 100.
235. Government of India, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, "Scheduled Tribes," online: <http://tribal.nic.
in/index.asp>.
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of mainstream society, have been historically marginalized, and are
23 6
discriminated against.
On this basis, I would argue that there should not be a creamy layer
distinction within the Aboriginal category, similarly as there is not one in
India for the ST. Due to historical circumstances, the Aboriginal groups
have been constitutionally provided with protection and this protection
should not be interpreted in a manner which will eventually reduce or
diminsh any type of ameliorative benefits or Aboriginal rights. There is no
time limit or expiration date in the Canadian Charteror ConstitutionAct,
1982; regarding Aboriginal rights. In the event that one day Aboriginal
people will not require ameliorative programs, the government will respond
accordingly since s. 15(2) is an enabling provision and does not place any
positive obligation on government to implement affirmative action. As a
result, if Aboriginal communities are one day no longer disadvantaged,
the government would not contemplate programs which target them.
But, Aboriginal constitutional rights would nevertheless remain in force,
regardless of disadvantage.
Although there was no discussion regarding a privileged class
within the Aboriginal groups in Lovelace, the appellants argued that they
belonged to a disadvantaged group and they were being excluded from
the government program. lacobucci J. clearly stated that there would be
no assessment of relative disadvantage as this would encourage a "race to
the bottom," and also because he noted that the appellants and the targeted
group for the program were all disadvantaged. The "race to the bottom"
has also been a recognized phenomenon in India by the Supreme Court
of India.237 This is a question which the Supreme Court of India engaged
in when it directed that the State sever the more disadvantaged from a
disadvantaged class within the OBC by identifying a creamy layer.
On the other hand, the creamy layer distinction should apply to the
enumerated ground of race under s. 15 and race as a category generally.
The OBCs are comparable to (visible) racial minorities in Canada, based
on the great internal variances of language, culture, religion, ethnic origin,
appearance and because of immigration.23 8 As Aboriginals have been
classified as a specified race in the Canadian constitutional framework,

236. See Corbiere,supra note 127, and Lovelace, supra note 139.
237. See Justice Pasayat's remarks on the motion for a stay in Thakur 2007, supra note 65 at para.
21: "Nowhere else in the world do castes, classes or communities queue up for the sake of gaining
backward status. Nowhere else in the world is there competition to assert backwardness and then [sic]
to claim we are more backward than you."
238. Here, I am using some of the indicators that Jenkins used to compare the OBCs to American
Hispanics. See Jenkins, "Race," supra note 18.
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in India the SC/ST have been specifically classified by caste and tribe.
Conversely, various other racial groups such as South Asians, East
Asians or Blacks have not been categorized individually in any Canadian
constitutional document by race. Similarly, the OBC have not been listed
in the Indian Constitution.
The Kapp Court noted that to define the disadvantaged, not all
members of a group need to be disadvantaged as long as the group as a
whole has experienced discrimination. 39 They also stated that the fact that
some individual band members may not experience personal disadvantage
does not negate the group disadvantage suffered by a band member.240
This language appears to preclude a creamy layer assessment within the
Aboriginal category, but at the same time acknowledges that there may
be a section of the group which is not truly disadvantaged. This opens the
door wider to a creamy layer analysis.2 4'
Using the Kapp Court's test for s. 15(2), it appears that a creamy layer
test could be applied in Canada. The government would need to show
that the affirmative action program had an ameliorative purpose, and in
the second part of the test, show that the program targets a disadvantaged
group identified by an enumerated or analogous ground. The Supreme
Court of India has stated that the OBC category is only defined as such
once the creamy layer is removed. Using the same procedure in the case of
race under a s. 15(2) assessment, the disadvantaged targeted racial group
would need to have already shed its creamy layer members to be defined
as a category.
If the creamy layer assessment is used, in practical terms, the
government would need to assess which members of a racial group met the
threshold of being disadvantaged. An assessment of social advancement
which would include a social, educational and economic test would be
required in the Canadian context in order to achieve similar results to
the Indian evaluation of identifying the OBC; a Canadian version of the
Mandal Report.
The Supreme Court of India emphasized that an economic test cannot
be the sole criterion for defining the creamy layer, however, they also did
239. Kapp, supranote 140 at para. 55.
240. Ibid. at para. 59.
241. Alternatively, the examination of a creamy layer in relation to affirmative action programs
targeting women may require additional considerations. Although in Canada women belong to a
designated equity group, there may be arguments in favour of applying the creamy layer analysis
to them as well. This is because women belong to all groups and classes, including the advantaged
and disadvantaged. However, at the same, the creamy layer analysis should not displace any policy
regarding gender parity. Of note is that the Indian Constitution does not preclude provisions for a
women's reservation (art. 15(3)).
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not provide any specific criteria which should be used. In Canada, some
criteria for who would belong to a creamy layer have been alluded to by
some of the authors cited above: the economically advantaged (Anand);
people within a racial category who have bachelor degrees, hold managerial
or professional positions, or who own high valued homes (Pager); or
those who have not suffered disadvantage either economically or socially
(Cereste). More specifically, borrowing from some of the creamy layer
criteria outlined by the NCBC in India, children of the prime minister
or any cabinet minister, children of judges, white collar professionals
or university professors, children who come from families where the
gross annual income is perhaps above $150,000, or children of business
executives in the private sector could be excluded from preferential policies
which target disadvantage.
As noted above, the only race-based identification of a group in the
Canadian constitutional documents is the Aboriginal population. The
terms visible minority or race, for example, are not defined. Likewise,
under arts. 15(4), (5) and 16(4), the backward classes are not listed in
the Indian Constitution, but are identified by the Central and State
governments. There are no separate government lists of racial groups who
can be legally identified as a racial minority in Canada. In India, the State
decides who is an OBC. In Canada, people self-identify as belonging to a
42
racial category.
For racial groups other than Aboriginals, the creamy layer distinction
should be considered, given the fact that there is great internal variance
243
within racial groups, which leads to the problem of overinclusion.
However, the creamy layer concept will only be relevant depending on
the affirmative action program and its goals. If the goal of affirmative
action in Canada is to prevent inequality or disadvantage and to target the
truly disadvantaged, -then the creamy layer concept should be applied. If
representation or diversity is the main goal of an affirmative action program,
then the creamy layer concept might be inapplicable and irrelevant, as
this aim of the program would merely be visual and based on optics or
numbers.
It seems inevitable that a "race to the bottom" will exist whenever
specialized or attractive goods are available to a limited group of people,
such as jobs or seats at university. This will occur whether there is a

242. See the Employment Equity Act, S.C., 1995, c.44, ss. 2, 9(2) [EEA]. Employment. equity is
only implemented towards persons who self-identity as belonging to a designated group: women,
Aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities.
243. See above discussion in Part 11.
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quota or whether the job or seats are available to increase representation.
Onwuachi-Willig and John Martinez explain the issue of ethnic/racial fraud
during the admissions process at universities in the U.S.A. as one type
'
White students are trying to discover minority
of race to the "bottom."244
races in their ancestry through biological testing or in another example, a
woman who checked off the "Hispanic" box in her law school application
claimed in her interview that she did so because she had a child with her
ex-husband who was Hispanic. Onwuachi-Willig notes that these students
are trying to claim a biological race which does not match their social
experience. There is no reason to doubt that forms of ethnic fraud occur or
would occur while people in Canada apply for jobs which are slotted for
or encourage racial minority applicants.
The creamy layer assessment would not be applicable in public sector
employment, as the government's hiring goals appear to be focussed on
diversity and representation of Canadian society.245 Although public sector
employment is a limited resource, the aim of the public employer is not
to alleviate disadvantage, but rather to present a civil service that reflects
Canada's diverse population.
Unlike the situation in India, in Canada government may not be
directly involved in any affirmative action policies regarding university
education.246 An affirmative action plan in universities may not face judicial
constitutional scrutiny under s. 15(2) unless substantial government control
can be found. Thus, within the Canadian Charter context, the creamy
layer examination could not be applied to universities. However, it may be
considered by academic administrators when tailoring equity or affirmative
action policies, since the creamy layer concept may be applicable to the
federal and provincial human rights instruments.
As noted above, s. 14(1) of the OHRC is comparable to s. 15(2) of
the Canadian Charter in that it allows for special programs to relieve
disadvantage. In the case where a university may implement a special
program to admit students who belong to racial minorities, a creamy layer
analysis would certainly be appropriate. As noted in the examples above in
Part II, using race as a category can be overinclusive and provide benefits to
people of that category who do not require them. Admissions committees
would need to set parameters for who would belong to the creamy layer,
based on whether the university was seeking to alleviate disadvantage

244. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 117 at 1215-1220; John Martinez, "Trivializing Diversity: The
Problem of Overinclusion in Affirmative Action Programs" (1995) 12 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 49 at 49.
245. See generally, EEA, supra note 242.
246. See McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
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and provide equal opportunity to racial groups, or whether it was simply
seeking greater numbers of racial minorities to appear representative of the
population. The creamy layer assessment would not be relevant though, if
the university's goal was merely representation.
Examples of individualized assessments of student applicants may
involve combinations of the methods used by the Rutgers Law SchoolNewark, the University ofVictoria Law School and Dalhousie Law School's
IB&M Initiative. These law schools examined applicants' socio-economic
backgrounds, any adversity the student might have overcome, indigenous
roots, ancestral heritage, public or community service, and cultural or
economic factors, in addition to academic performance and LSAT scores.
And race is only one criterion, just as caste is only one consideration when
defining the OBC. In assessing whether applicants belong to the creamy
layer, admissions committees may look to the suggested criteria mentioned
above, such as the parents' income or occupation, or whether the applicant
is already a professional. These holistic evaluations would assist the law
schools in selecting the most deserving students for admission.
Affirmative action is a form through which one may correct the
wrongs of discrimination. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to
exclude the creamy layer from targeted beneficiaries in order to provide
the most egalitarian opportunities possible to people who have been and
who continue to be marginalized.
Conclusion
Disadvantage is not static. In the Indian context, there is caste mobility
as well as economic and social mobility amongst and within generations.
In Canada, although one's race may remain static, an individual's social,
educational and economic status may change due to opportunity. The
creamy layer is a dynamic determination with an evolving membership. The
concept underlying the creamy layer is to identify advantaged individuals
within a disadvantaged group, in order to alleviate disadvantage. For this
reason, the creamy layer notion is relevant in any diverse society such
as Canada which seeks equality. It is also an essential element of a "just
2 47

society".

The creamy layer concept from the Supreme Court of India ought to
be imported, examined and considered by the Supreme Court of Canada
in its future hearings on s. 15(2) of the CanadianCharter.It is suggested
that when the Supreme Court of Canada assesses the ameliorative nature

247. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society" in Thomas S.Axworthy & Pierre Elliot
Trudeau, eds., Towards a Just Society (Markham: Viking, 1989) 357 at 362.
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of the program that it examine whether a creamy layer exists within the
targeted group and whether the government has appropriately tailored the
program to suit only the disadvantaged. This will permit greater scrutiny
of the program in question and reveal whether or not the targeted group is
in fact truly disadvantaged or in need of the special program, in order to
ensure that substantive equality is pursued.

